

European Food Safety Authority

European Cooperation on crisis response

Tobin Robinson Head of Unit, Emerging Risks

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- Crisis preparedness and response
- Urgent requests for advice
- An example: *E. coli* O104:H4



Crisis preparedness

Two crisis preparedness activities



• Established procedures:

- Published on EFSA's website; « ESFA Procedures for responding to urgent advice needs »
- ✓ Revised each year (or as neccessary)

- Training exercises
 - ✓ Take place every year

Emergency Manual



- Activation of urgent advice structure and response levels
- Participants, roles and responsabilities
- Information management and record keeping
- Facilities, including the crisis room
- Staffing issues and business continuity
- Downgrading response levels
- Evaluation

EFSA Crisis Simulation Exercises effs

- Organised in peacetime by EFSA
- To improve its interaction with EC, MS and sister agencis (ECDC, ECHA, JRC, EURL) to address urgent issues
- Continuous programme of exercises
- Each exercise designed to explore functioning of different aspects of "crisis" response
- Prepared and executed by a contractor with scientific support from an expert Working Group

Our four-year training strategy





Training Module 4 (2015) End-to-end exercise encompassing all three aspects above



EFSA's communications on urgent information requests



- ✓ Importance of framing, provision of background information
- ✓ E.g. EFSA's thematic approach to zoonoses
- Independent scientific advice and pro-active, coordinated risk communications both play an important role
- EFSA's rapid reaction procedures show how cooperation on communication between MS / EFSA / European Commission can work to the benefit of all stakeholders



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Urgent requests to EFSA

Eleven urgent requests received



Response (days)

Melamine in food and feed (2007)	;	30	
Mineral oil in sunflower oil (2008)		<1	
Melamine in infant milk (2008)	ł	5	
Dioxins in pork meat (2008)	2		
4-methlybenzophenone in breakfast cereals (2009	9)	13	
Nicotine in wild mushrooms (2009)		10	
Chlormequat in table grapes (2010)		1	
Volcanic ash (2010)	6		
Escherichia coli in sprouted seeds (2011)		7	
Schmallenberg Virus (2012)	10		
2 year feeding trial on GMO maize and glyphosate	e (9 and ongoing	
			10



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STEC O104 outbreaks in Germany and France: EFSA's response and lessons learnt



Causative organism



- Shiga-toxin producing Escherichia coli (STEC) serotype O104:H4 and carries substantial antibiotic resistance.
- Reservoir: not clear

Shares virulence characteristics of STEC (animal reservoir) and of enteroaggregative E.coli (EAEC) (human reservoir) strains

• Origin: previously very rare in Europe

10 cases of STEC O104 infection reported to ECDC (2004-2010): only three were of serotype O104:H4 (Finland 2010, Italy 2009 and France 2004): travel in North Africa;

A review of the literature revealed that STEC O104:H4 has also been isolated in Germany, twice (2001). German isolates differed from the 2011 outbreak strain

Epidemic (I)



- Germany
 - First case 1st week of May
 - Epidemic peak 200 cases per day: 22 May
- European level
 - Germany reports to Commission and MS on 21 May
 - First audio conference of Commission 24 May
- France
 - 24 June cluster in Bègles (near Bordeaux)
- 7 July end of the outbreak
 - 4000 cases, incl. 50 deaths

EFSA's Involvement



- First phase (24 May 8 June): Preparatory Review
 - ✓ EFSA/ECDC advice published 3 June
 - Literature Review: presence of enteric pathogens in plant material
 - ✓ Summarisation of STEC data previously reported in the EU
- Second phase (5 16 June): Support German Task Force leading Outbreak Investigation in Germany
 - ✓ Worked 'shoulder to shoulder' with the colleagues from the Federal Ministry and Research Institutes and the Länder to develop, set up and implement the tracing back and tracing forward investigations
 - Led to the identification of sprouts as the vehicle and Establishment A as the source of the sprouts

EFSA's Involvement



- Third phase (24 June 5 July): Led the European Task Force to Investigate Common Cause between French and German outbreaks
 - ✓ Set up Task Force to trace common link: <u>seeds</u> used to produce sprouts
 - ✓ Identified a Lot of Fenugreek seeds imported from Egypt into Germany via Antwerp/Rotterdam.
- Fourth phase: follow-up mandate to BIOHAZ Panel (30 Oct) and:
 - Taking Stock
 - Lessons Learnt

Source of the Infection



- 41 well described outbreak clusters with a common link to sprout producer
 - Further epidemiological investigations linked disease occurrence with either of 2 sprouted seed mixtures:
 - Mild blend: 4 types of sprouts
 - Spicey blend: 3 types of sprouts
- Only lentil and fenugreek sprouts were common to both mixtures


Epidemic - French outbreak



- Before French outbreak, 13 EU/EEA countries reported cases associated to the outbreak in Germany. All cases linked to travel to northern Germany
- 24th June France reported a cluster of patients with bloody diarrhoea: none of the food handlers or guests had recently travelled to Germany or had contact with travellers from Germany
- <u>Microbiological characterization</u> of the isolates from <u>French outbreak</u>: indistinguishable



EFSA Task Force: Link between German and French outbreaks



Source: http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/supporting/doc/176e.pdf

Communication



- EFSA first issued a brief statement informing interested parties that it was monitoring the German outbreak on 27 May 2011.
- A further seven news stories in the following five weeks addressing public health advice, the results of it urgent scientific advice as well as the role of the European Task Force.
- Public health advice was issued jointly with ECDC to ensure the European agencies were aligned.
- EFSA tried to align its communication efforts with other organisations and liaise with its Focal Point and Advisory Forum Communications Working Group networks.
- The Authority also briefed the Commission's Health & Security Committee's Communicator's Network on its on-going activities on an *ad hoc* basis.

Communication



- EFSA's investment in establishing strong links with MS, also from a communications perspective, proved important during the outbreak.
- Significantly, EFSA created a table with an overview of who was saying what and since when which was kept up-to-date and shared with MS. This proved a useful tool for both communicators and Risk Managers.

LESSONS LEARNED



- EFSA was **well prepared in peace time** to help with the outbreak investigation when it occurred
 - ✓ peace-time data collection networks, with ECDC
 ✓ peace-time collaboration on communication (MS, EC, EU Agencies)
 ✓ on-going cooperation with management of competent
 - authorities through EFSA Advisory Forum
 - \checkmark dedicated EmRisk unit, organised repeated crisis exercises
- EFSA had **staff** to offer with the technical competence (data collection) that mastered the language and knew the concerned institutions
- IT tools for food tracing could be further developed





Thank you very much for your attention!